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The United States-Cuba “Havana Club” trademark dispute has been one of the more contro-
versial and potentially divisive cases before the World Trade Organization (’WTO’) to date. In
that case, the European Union (’EU’) filed a complaint against the United States alleging that a
law which prohibited the registration and enforcement in the United States of a Cuban trademark,
’Havana Club’ rum, which was licensed to the French company, Pernod-Ricard, S.A. (’Pernod-
Ricard’), was in violation of the WTO Agreement, which protected the intellectual property rights
of WTO Members and their nationals. The case intertwined enforcement of the U.S. Cuban em-
bargo; U.S. domestic politics, particularly in the state of Florida; U.S. national security concerns
with U.S. trade obligations under the WTO; and U.S. relations with the EU. Essentially, the EU
was asking the WTO to invalidate the U.S. law, which had been passed by the U.S. Congress to
implement the Cuban embargo and to protect the national security of the United States. If the
WTO rules that a country’s law violates a WTO Agreement, then that country has to change the
law, pay compensation, or suffer retaliation. An adverse ruling by the WTO could have had the
effect of nullifying the U.S. law and overturning the Federal Court of Appeals decision upholding
it. This would have caused serious repercussions in the United States and could have led to calls
for the United States withdrawal from the WTO, or at least to demands for fundamental changes to
the WTO’s powers. It also could have led to a trade war with the EU. This Article will analyze the
controversy before the U.S. courts and the WTO, and the structure of the WTO and its dispute set-
tlement system. In particular, the Article will review the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, which upheld the U.S. law, and the ruling of the WTO Dispute Panel, which
upheld and struck down portions of that law. The Article will also review the decision of the WTO
Appellate Body, which affirmed the right of the United States not to enforce trademarks that had
been confiscated, while also ruling that the U.S. law was discriminatory in its effect on foreigners,
and thus, in violation of the WTO agreements. The Article will also discuss the political ramifica-
tions of the case for the United States, both internationally and domestically. The true importance
of the Havana Club case is that it shows the interplay between domestic politics, international pol-
itics, and international trade law. This Article will argue that intellectual property rights and their
international enforcement are dictated to a large degree by the interests of the intellectual property
right holders and by politics, rather than by the application of a normative system of law adopted
and applied on the basis of sound legal principles.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States-Cuba "Havana Club" trademark dispute
has been one of the more controversial and potentially divisive
cases before the World Trade Organization ("WTO") to date. In
that case, the European Union ("EU") 1 filed a complaint against
the United States alleging that a law which prohibited the regis-
tration and enforcement in the United States of a Cuban trade-
mark, "Havana Club" rum, which was licensed to the French
company, Pernod-Ricard, S.A. ("Pernod-Ricard"), was in viola-
tion of the WTO Agreement, which protected the intellectual
property rights of WTO Members and their nationals.
The case intertwined enforcement of the U.S. Cuban em-
bargo; U.S. domestic politics, particularly in the state of Florida;
U.S. national security concerns with U.S. trade obligations under
the WTO; and U.S. relations with the EU. Essentially, the EU
was asking the WTO to invalidate the U.S. law, which had been
passed by the U.S. Congress to implement the Cuban embargo
and to protect the national security of the United States. If the
WTO rules that a country's law violates a WTO Agreement, then
that country has to change the law, pay compensation, or suffer
retaliation. An adverse ruling by the WTO could have had the
effect of nullifying the U.S. law and overturning the Federal
Court of Appeals decision upholding it. This would have caused
serious repercussions in the United States and could have led to
* Donald R. Dinan, Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center,
specializing in international trade law, intellectual property law, and litigation. He ad-
vises both foreign and domestic clients in these areas, often combining all three disci-
plines to obtain resolutions of international trade problems. Professor Dinan practices
before the trade agencies of the United States government, including the International
Trade Commission, the Department of Commerce, and the United States Trade Repre-
sentative. Professor Dinan is also an attorney with the law firm of Hall, Estill, Hardwick,
Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C. in Washington, D.C.
1. The official name for the European Union at the WTO is the "European Com-
munities." For the sake of uniformity and understanding, this Article will use the name
"European Union" or "EU" throughout.
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calls for the United States withdrawal from the WTO, or at least
to demands for fundamental changes to the WTO's powers. It
also could have led to a trade war with the EU.
This Article will analyze the controversy before the U.S.
courts and the WTO, and the structure of the WTO and its dis-
pute settlement system. In particular, the Article will review the
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
which upheld the U.S. law, and the ruling of the WTO Dispute
Panel, which upheld and struck down portions of that law. The
Article will also review the decision of the WTO Appellate Body,
which affirmed the right of the United States not to enforce
trademarks that had been confiscated, while also ruling that the
U.S. law was discriminatory in its effect on foreigners, and thus,
in violation of the WTO agreements.
The Article will also discuss the political ramifications of the
case for the United States, both internationally and domestically.
The true importance of the Havana Club case is that it shows the
interplay between domestic politics, international politics, and
international trade law. This Article will argue that intellectual
property rights and their international enforcement are dictated
to a large degree by the interests of the intellectual property
right holders and by politics, rather than by the application of a
normative system of law adopted and applied on the basis of
sound legal principles.
I. THE WTO, TRIPS, AND THE DSU
The WTO was created by the Final Act Embodying the Re-
sults of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
in Marrakesh on April 15, 1994.2 The signers agreed to submit
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
("WTO Agreement")3 to their respective governments for adop-
tion. The WTO formally came into being on January 1, 1995.
The WTO was designed to conduct trade relations among its
Member States and to administer the eighteen Multilateral
Trade Agreements, also known as the Uruguay Round Agree-
2. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VO1.
1, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
3. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter WTO Agreement].
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ments, which resulted from the Uruguay Round negotiations.4
By joining the WTO, one automatically joined all eighteen Uru-
guay Round Agreements. The United States joined the WTO
through the Uruguay Round Implementation Act, which Con-
gress passed on December 8, 1994.'
Among the eighteen Uruguay Round Agreements adminis-
tered by the WTO is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement" or "TRIPS.") 6
The TRIPS Agreement was designed to provide a comprehensive
system of intellectual property rights. It incorporates some of
the more important intellectual property conventions, including
the Paris Convention for the Protection Of Industrial Property
(1967) ("Paris Convention") 7 and the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works ("Berne Convention") .8
It requires each country to meet minimum standards of intellec-
tual property protection and to provide mechanisms for their
enforcement.'
Two of the most important principles of the TRIPS Agree-
ment are the "national treatment" and "most-favorite-nation"
("MFN") obligations it imposes on each WTO Member. Na-
tional treatment requires each WTO Member to give nationals
from other Member countries treatment that is no less favorable
than that which it gives to its own nationals with regard to the
protection of intellectual property rights.1l The MFN principle
4. See WTO Agreement, arts. 1I and III.
5. Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809.
6. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RoUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS].
7. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, re-
vised at Brussels on Dec. 14, 1900, revised at Washington on June 2, 1911, revised at the
Hague on Nov. 6, 1925, revised at London on June 2, 1934, revised at Lisbon on Oct. 31,
1958, revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinaf-
ter Paris Convention].
8. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of Sept. 9,
1886, completed at Paris on May 4, 1896, revised at Berlin on Nov. 13, 1908, revised at
Berne on Mar. 20, 1914, revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, revised at Brussels on June 26,
1948, revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, amended on
Oct. 2, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
9. See Statement of Administrative Action-Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, URUGUAY RoUND TRADE AGREEMENTS Vol. 1, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess., Hse. Doc. 103-316, Vol. 1, arts. II & III, at 981 (1994) [hereinafter SAA].
10. See infra Part III.E.
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requires that each Member grant to nationals of other Member
countries any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity given to
nationals of any country with regard to the protection of intellec-
tual property rights.''
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU") created a mechanism for dis-
pute settlement procedures for each Uruguay Round Agree-
ment, including the TRIPS Agreement. 12 The DSU is adminis-
tered by the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"). The DSB is em-
powered to 1) establish Panels; 2) adopt Panel and Appellate
Body reports; 3) oversee the implementation of Panel recom-
mendations; and 4) authorize retaliation. 13
All disputes under the Uruguay Round Agreements must be
filed under the DSU before the DSB."4 If a Panel or the Appel-
late Body finds a violation of a WATO Agreement, it shall recom-
mend that the respondent government bring its law into con-
formity with the respective agreement.' 5
If a respondent government fails to implement a Panel or
Appellate Body recommendation to bring its law into conformity
with an Uruguay Round Agreement, that government must
enter into negotiations with the complaining party to reach an
agreement on compensation.'" If the respondent government
does not enter into negotiations for compensation, or fails to
reach an agreement on compensation, then the complaining
government can petition the DSB to authorize retaliation where
the complaining government can suspend concessions (i.e., raise
tariffs) against goods from the violating country in the amount
of the terms of trade which are adversely affected by the viola-
tion. 7
Therefore, if a country loses a WTO case, it may choose to
change its law or to offer compensation instead. Conversely, if a
violating country does nothing, the complaining country can re-
11. See SAA, supra n.9, at 981-82; see also infra Part II.F.
12. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF TrIE
URU.UAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994).
13. See id. art. 2.
14. See id. art. 23.
15. See id. art. 19.
16. See id. art. 22.
17. Id.
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taliate by suspending trade concessions equivalent to the trade it
has lost because of the offending measure. It is within this legal
framework that the EU brought its case against the United States
law, which prohibited the registration and enforcement of the
"Havana Club" trademark, and alleged that the law violated the
TRIPS Agreement.
II. THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE WTO CASE
A. Facts - the Controversy
It all began when Pernod-Ricard, the French international
spirits company, decided to enter into a joint venture with a Cu-
ban State-owned entity for distribution of rum under the name
Havana Club. 8 Prior to the Cuban revolution in 1959, Havana
Club was one of the largest selling rums in the world, with the
United States being its major market. Havana Club was manu-
factured by Jose Arechabala, S.A. ('JASA"). The company was
owned and controlled by the Arechabala family. In 1960, Fidel
Castro confiscated most large private holdings in Cuba for State
use. This includedJASA. NeitherJASA nor the Arechabala fam-
ily received compensation for the assets the Cuban government
seized.
In 1963, the United States imposed an embargo on Cuba
that is still in force today. The embargo is enforced by the Cu-
ban Assets Control Regulations ("CACR")." In 1996, Congress
enacted the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act
("LIBERTAD"),2 ° which, among other things, codified regula-
tions implementing the Cuban embargo. 2' The Secretary of the
18. The following statement of facts is largely taken from the findings of fact in the
decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and of the Panel
Report of the WVTO. See Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 119-
22 (2d Cir. 2000); see also World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel-United States-
Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS/176/R, Doc. No. 01-3806 (Aug.
6, 2001), paras. 2.1-2.13. Cf other renditions of facts by Elizabeth Olson, A Ruling on
Rum W'O Backs U.S. in Trademark Spat, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Aug. 7, 2001, at 6, col. 7;
Daniel Pruzin, Panel Established to Rule in Havana Club Dispute, 17 INT'L TRADE REP. no.
38, 1470-71 (Sept. 28, 2000); 18 INT'L TRADE REP. 935-36 (Aug. 14, 2001).
19. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations ("CACR"), as amended 31 C.F.R.
515.101-909 (1999), promulgated pursuant to Section 5(b) of Trading of the Enemy
Act of 1917, as amended 12 U.S.C. Sec. 95(a).
20. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110
Stat. 785 (1996) ("LIBERTAD").
21. See 22 U.S.C. Sec. 6032(h).
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Treasury was given the authority to administer the Cuban em-
bargo, which authority, in turn, was delegated by the Secretary to
the Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC").22
Cubaexport, a State-owned enterprise, exported Havana
Club rum, primarily to the communist countries in Eastern Eu-
rope and to the Soviet Union from 1972 to 1993. Cubaexport
had registered the "Havana Club" trademark with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") in 1976 under Re-
gistration No. 1,031,631. In 1993, Cubaexport decided to seek a
foreign partner for its Havana Club rum business. In this re-
gard, Havana Rum and Liquors, S.A. ("HR&L"), was formed
under the laws of Cuba. Consequently, HR&L entered into a
joint-venture agreement with Pernod-Ricard. In November
1993, Pernod-Ricard and HR&L entered into an agreement,
which formed Havana Club Holding, S.A. ("HCH"), a Luxem-
burg corporation, and Havana Club International, S.A. ("HCI"),
a Cuban corporation. Cubaexport then assigned its U.S. trade-
marks to HR&L, which, in turn, assigned them to HCH on June
22, 1994. HCH renewed the U.S. registration for the "Havana
Club" mark for a term of ten years in 1996.
Meanwhile, in 1996, Bacardi & Company, Ltd., a Bermuda
corporation, and Bacardi-Martini USA, Inc., a Delaware corpora-
tion (collectively "Bacardi") began to sell in the United States
Havana Club-labeled rum, which was made in the Bahamas. Ba-
cardi-Martini's predecessor-in-interest, Galleon S.A. had begun
selling Havana Club rum manufactured in the Bahamas in the
United States in 1995. In April 1997, Bacardi also bought the
rights, if any, to the "Havana Club" mark from the Arechabala
family. Pernod-Ricard, through HCH and HCI, filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, seeking an injunction against Bacardi and an enforcement
of its "Havana Club" trademark in the United States.
Pernod-Ricard obviously wanted to protect its rights to the
U.S. market if and when the forty-year Cuban embargo is lifted.
The stakes continue to be fairly high. The current U.S. market
for rum is approximately fifteen million cases a year.23 Bacardi,
for its part, wanted to have the rights to Havana Club in the
United States, and more importantly, to protect its other brands,
22. See 31 C.F.R. Sec. 515.802.
23. See Pruzin, supra n.18, at 1471.
2003] ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES-CUBA RUM CASE 343
including its flagship brand, Bacardi rum, from foreign competi-
tion by Pernod-Ricard.
While the suit in the Southern District was pending, a new
twist to the case developed. At the end of the Congressional ses-
sion, Congress tacked on to the 1998 Omnibus Appropriations
Act ("OAA") 24 without hearing a provision known as Section
211. This bill was attached to the appropriations bill as a result
of heavy lobbying by Bacardi and was designed to stop Pernod-
Ricard from being able to enforce its rights to the trademark
"Havana Club" in the United States.
Section 211 of the OAA deals with trademarks, trade names,
and commercial names that are the same or substantially similar
to trademarks, trade names and commercial names that are used
in connection with businesses or assets that were confiscated by
the Cuban government on or after July 1, 1959. It is intended to
prevent the registration and enforcement in the United States of
trademarks confiscated by Cuba.
Section 211 (a) (1) prevents the registration or renewal of a
confiscated trademark by prohibiting a license authorizing the
transfer of such trademarks, or the payment of fees to register or
renew them, unless the original owner of the mark, or the
bona fide successor-in-interest, expressly consents. 25  Section
211(a)(2) prohibits U.S. courts from enforcing these trade-
marks, 26 and Section 211(b) prohibits U.S. courts from enforc-
24. The Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) [hereinafter OAA]. OAA was
passed to fund the federal government and to prevent a government shut down.
25. OAA Section 211 (a)(1) reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no transaction or payment shall
be authorized or approved pursuant to Section 515.527 of title 31, Code of
Federal Regulations, as in effect on September 9, 1998, with respect to a mark,
trade name, or commercial name that is the same as or substantially similar to
a mark, trade name, or commercial name that was used in connection with a
business or assets that were confiscated unless the original owner of the mark,




OAA Section 211 (a) (2) reads:
No U.S. court shall recognize, enforce or otherwise validate any assertion of
rights by a designated national based on common law rights or registration
obtained under such Section 515.527 of such a confiscated mark, trade name,
or commercial name.
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ing any treaty rights, which require recognition and enforce-
ment of these trademarks.27
B. The District Court's Ruling
In December 1996, HCH and HCI filed their lawsuit for
trademark infringement against Bacardi, alleging violation of
Sections 32 and 43 (a) of the Lanham Act.28 Bacardi alleged that
the license HCH received from OFAC authorizing the assign-
ments of the U.S. trademarks was obtained by fraud.
On October 5, 1995, OFAC received an application for a
specific license authorizing the 1994 assignments of the "Havana
Club" trademark from Cubaexport to HR&L, and then to HCH.
On November 13, 1995, OFAC issued a license to Cubaexport,
which approved the two assignments and authorized all neces-
sary transactions related to the assignments of the marks.
In March 1997, the District Court ruled that Bacardi did not
have standing to challenge OFAC's license and that OFAC's de-
cision to grant the specific license was unreviewable.29 On April
17, 1997, however, OFAC issued a notice on revocation, which
revoked this license, retroactive on the date of issuance. OFAC
stated that its determination to revoke the license was the result
of acts and circumstances that had come to its attention. It
should be noted that this revocation came one month after the
District Court ruled that Bacardi could not challenge the OFAC
license.
Subsequently, in August 1997, the District Court ruled that
HCH had no right to the "Havana Club" trademark in the
United States because the specific license to assign the mark had
been nullified by OFAC, and because the CACR's general license
27. OAA Section 211 (b) reads:
No U.S. court shall recognize, enforce or otherwise validate any assertion of
treaty rights by a designated national or its successor-in-interest under Sections
44 (b) or (e) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1126 (b) or (e)) for a
mark, trade name, or commercial name that is the same as or substantially
similar to a mark, trade name, or commercial name that was used in connec-
tion with a business or assets that were confiscated unless the original owner of
such mark, trade name, or commercial name, or the bona fide successor-in-
interest has expressly consented.
Id.
28. Id. See also 15 U.S.C. Secs. 1114, 1125(a).
29. See Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 961 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) ("Havana Club").
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authority under 31 C.F.R. sec. 515.527(a) did not authorize the
assignment.30
The Court, however, granted HCH and HCI the right to
amend the complaint to assert rights to the "Havana Club" trade
name under Sections 4 4 (g) and 44(h) of the Lanham Act, as
amended,3 and Chapter lII of the General Inter-American Con-
vention for Trademark and Commercial Protection of February
20, 1929 ("IAC")Y" Both Cuba and the United States are signa-
tories to the IAC.33 Congress, at the urging of Bacardi, passed
Section 211 of the OAA after this ruling by the District Court.
The law was obviously crafted to defeat Pernod-Ricard's claims.
This specificity of its target was to prove to be the undoing of
U.S. position before the WTO. 4
Subsequently, the District Court found that HCH, a Luxem-
burg corporation, could not claim rights to trademark protec-
tion under the IAC because Luxemburg was not a signatory to
the IAC.35 The District Court also ruled that it was prohibited
from enforcing HCI's trade name rights under the IAC by
211(b) of the OAA 6
The District Court concluded that HCI lacked standing to
assert its Lanham Act claims because it was barred from selling
its rum in the United States by the Cuban embargo and there-
fore, could not suffer commercial injury because of Bacardi's ac-
tion. The Court also found that any injury HCI might suffer
once the embargo was lifted was too remote to grant HCI stand-
ing. -3 7
HCH and HCI appealed.
C. The Second Circuit's Ruling
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the District Court's ruling, concluding that the Cuban
30. See Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 974 F. Supp. 302, 306-07
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Havana Club I").
31. 15 U.S.C. Secs. 112 6 (g) and (h).
32. 46 Stat. 2907, 2926-30 [hereinafter IAC].
33. See id. at 2907.
34. See infra Parts IV.E-F.
35. See Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 62 F.Supp.2d 1085, 1089
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Havana Club Ill").
36. See id. at 1091-95.
37. See id. at 1099.
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embargo barred assignment to HCH of the "Havana Club" trade-
mark registered in the United States; that it was precluded by
Section 211 of the OAA from enforcing whatever rights HCI
might have to trademark protection under the IAC; and that
HCI lacked standing to assert the false advertising and unfair
competition claims under the Lanham Act.3"
The Court noted that in order to prevail on its claim of
trademark infringement, HCH had to show that it had an owner-
ship interest in the mark. HCH asserted its rights to the mark
through the assignment from the Cuban companies. HCH rec-
ognized, however, that in order to have enforcement rights in
the United States, it had to find authority for the assignments
under U.S. law or the Cuban embargo would render them
void. 9
In its original complaint, HCH relied on the specific license
issued by OFAC in November 1995, which authorized the assign-
ments.4" However, OFAC revoked this specific license in 1997."'
After that, HCH had to rely on the general license authority in
31 C.F.R. Section 515.527, which states: "[t]ransactions related
to the registration and renewal in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office [ ... ] in which [ ... ] a Cuban national has an
interest are authorized. '4 2 This provision was added in 1995,
more than a year after the "Havana Club" trademark was as-
signed to HCH.43 HCH argued that even though OFAC revoked
the specific license, HCH could avail itself of the general li-
cense.
44
The Court disagreed. In its analysis, the Court found that
the assignments were not "related to" the registration and re-
newal of a trademark.45 The Court referred to 31 C.F.R. Section
38. Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 2000)
[hereinafter Havana Club IV].
39. Id. at 122.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 122-23 (quoting 31 C.F.R. Sec. 515.527). A general authorization grants
an automatic license to do the requested approved act or transaction. See 31 C.F.R. Sec.
515.527(a)(1). No application for the license is necessary. Id. A specific license to do a
requested act or transaction is granted only upon application and must be "specifically"
granted by OFAC. See 31 C.F.R. Sec. 501.801(b).
43. Havana Club IV, 203 F.3d at 123.
44. See id.
45. See id.
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515.502(a), which provides: "No [ ... ] authorization contained
in this part [ ... ] shall be deemed to authorize or validate any
transaction effected prior to the issuance thereof, unless such [
] authorization specifically so provides. '46 Both Sections
515.527 and 515.502(a) are part of the CACR. The assignment
to HCH occurred in 1994, which was prior to the issuance of
Section 515.527. 47 Because there was no retroactivity in Section
515.527, and certainly no specific authorization as to the "Ha-
vana Club" trademark, the Court found that Section 515.502(a)
prevented the transfer and that HCH could not avail itself of the
general license provision.48
The Court further found that Section 515.527 was an excep-
tion to the broad prohibitions of the Cuban embargo. It stated:
"[i] f every assignment of a trademark for which the registration
was subsequently renewed, were considered a transaction 're-
lated to' trademark renewal, the exception created by Section
515.527(a) (1) would swallow much of the general rule of the
Cuban embargo prohibiting transfers of trademarks. ' 49 The
Court noted that OFAC, the agency charged with implementing
the regulations and enforcing the embargo, interpreted Section
515.527 as not authorizing assignments. 50
HCH also argued that a failure to recognize its rights as an
assignee of the U.S. trademark would deny rights guaranteed by
Article 11 of the IAC,5 ' which provides:
The transfer of the ownership of a registered or deposited
mark in the country of its original registration shall be effec-
tive and shall be recognized in the other Contracting States,
provided that reliable proof be furnished that such transfer
has been executed and registered in the accordance with the
internal law of the State in which such transfer took place.
Such transfer shall be recorded in accordance with the legis-
lation of the country in which it is to be effective.5 2
The Court ruled, however, that the Cuban embargo abrogated
the LAC rights that Article 11 would otherwise give concerning
46. Id. See also 31 C.F.R. Sec. 515.502(a).
47. See id.
48. See Havana Club IV, 203 F.3d at 123.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 123-24.
51. Id. at 124.
52. IAC, at 2922-24.
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Cuba.5 3 The Court stated:
With respect to the Cuban embargo, the purpose of Congress
could not be more clear. Congress wished to prevent any Cu-
ban national or entity from attracting hard currency into
Cuba by selling, assigning, or otherwise transferring rights
subject to United States jurisdiction. The CACR make this
clear, and the LIBERTAD Act, by codifying the CACR, pro-
vides unmistakable evidence of Congressional purpose. 4
The Court continued to note that the intent of Congress was
[t] o create a "chilling effect" that will deny the current Cuban
regime venture capital, discourage third-country nationals
from seeking to profit from illegally confiscated property, and
help preserve such property until such time as the rightful
owners can successfully assert their claims [ . .. ] In other
words, Congress sought to discourage business arrangements
like Cubaexport's joint venture with Pernod-Ricard, the ven-
ture that led to both the creation of HCH and the assign-
ments of a trademark confiscated by the Castro regime from
JASA.55
The Court made reference to Section 211(a) (1) to further
support its ruling. The Court stated that Congress explicitly re-
stricted Section 515.527 not to authorize or approve any transac-
tion with respect to a mark or trade name that was confiscated
unless the original owner of the mark expressly consented.5 6
Therefore, the Court found that HCH had no enforceable rights
to the "Havana Club" trademark.5 7
Next, the Court addressed HCI's claims to rights to the "Ha-
vana Club" trade name under the IAC.5' The IAC provides that
any manufacturer in a Member country who uses a particular
trade name may enjoin the use of that name in another coun-
53. See Havana Club IV, 203 F.3d at 124.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 125 (quoting H. Rep. No. 104-202, 25 (1996), reprinted in 1996 United
States Code Congressional and Administrative News ("U.S.C.C.A.N.") 527, 530).
56. Id. at 126.
57. Havana Club tV, 203 F.3d at 126. The Court did not rely on Section 211 (a) (1)
to invalidate the 1994 assignments because of the possible retroactive effect, but only to
indicate that interpreting Section 515.527 not to authorize the assignment was fully
consistent with Congressional intent not to permit assignments of confiscated trade-
marks without the consent of the original owner. Id.
58. Id.
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try.59
The Court ruled that Section 211(b) specifically provided
that
[n]o U.S. court shall recognize, enforce or otherwise validate
any assertions of treat)' rights by a designated national or its
successor-in-interest under Sections 44(b) or (e) of the
Trademark Act of 1946 [ . . .] for a mark, or trade name, or
commercial name [ . . .] that was used in connection with a
business or assets that were confiscated unless the original
owner of such mark, trade name, or commercial name
has expressly consented.6 °
Therefore, the Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to
hear HCI's claim. 6'
Finally, the Court found that HCI did not have standing to
assert a false advertising claim or an unfair competition claim
under the Lanham Act because it had no protectable interests in
the United States and had no realistic expectation of a protect-
able interest in the future.62 The Court stated that HCI had
failed to show any potential for a commercial or competitive in-
jury.63
The Court, likewise, summarily rejected HCI's argument
that it was harmed because Americans who could legally
purchase Havana Club in Havana would be confused by Bacardi
rum's bearing the label "Havana Club."64 The Court succinctly
found that the surveys on which HCI relied were endemically
flawed.65
D. Sequence of Events
The sequence of events bears some instruction on how a
party may use the interplay between national law and the WTO
to attempt to achieve a desired result.66 HCH received the as-
59. See IAC, at 2928-30.
60. Havana Club V, 203 F.3d at 127 (quoting Sec. 211). Section 211 refers to the
Section of the Lanham Act, which protects rights to trade names and commercial
names arising under treaty and provides that these rights may be enforced under U.S.
law. See 15 U.S.C. Secs. 1126(b) and (e).
61. See id.
62. See id. at 130-34.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 131.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 119-22 (noting dates of following legal actions).
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signment to the trademark on January 10, 1994, and re-regis-
tered it with the PTO in June 1996 for an additional ten-year
period. HCH and HCI filed their infringement suit in Decem-
ber 1996 after Bacardi bought Galleon and began importing
rum into the United States under the "Havana Club" name. Ba-
cardi bought the rights to the trademark from the Arechabala
family in April 1997. The U.S. Congress passed Section 211 of
the OAA on October 21, 1998. It was only after HCH and HCI
filed suit, that Bacardi engaged in the activities that would give
rise to the WTO case - buying the rights from the Arechabala
family and getting Congress to pass Section 211. The District
Court ruled against HCH and HCI on June 28, 1999. The EU
requested consultations under the DSU on July 7, 1999.67
Therefore, we see that the EU waited until the District
Court ruled before it filed its request for consultations, rather
than seeking consultations immediately after Section 211 was
passed. This indicates at least some interest by the EU to see
how the Court would rule before commencing the WTO chal-
lenge to the law.
Consultations occurred between the EU and the United
States on September 13, 1999 and December 13, 1999. On Feb-
ruary 4, 2000, the Second Circuit issued its ruling, upholding the
District Court decision. It was only afterwards, on June 30, 2000,
that the EU requested the establishment of a Panel under the
DSU, even though it had the right to do so almost ten months
earlier. Again, it is submitted that the timing is not coincidental.
Rather, one sees the EU taking each procedural step under the
DSU's procedures only after receiving the respective Court rul-
ings.68
67. See World Trade Organization, United States - Section 211 Omnibus Apprapriation
Act of 1998 - Report of the Panel, WT/DS 176/R, Doc. No. 01-3806, paras. 1.1-1.9 (Aug. 6,
2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispue/dispustatus-e.htm
[hereinafter European Communities v. United States]. Generally, the first step in a
WTO case under the DSU is to request consultations with the government whose law is
in dispute. See DSU, art. 4. A country must wait at least sixty days after it makes the
request for consultations before it can request the establishment of a dispute Panel and
submit in writing its specific charges. See id. arts. 3 and 6.
68. HCH and HCI did apply for a writ of certiorari before the U.S. Supreme Court
after the Second Circuit's ruling and before the EU requested the establishment of the
Panel. The EU requested the Panel, however, before waiting for the Supreme Court's
ruling on the writ. This is not necessarily inconsistent with the described behavior be-
cause the chances of the Supreme Court granting a writ of certiorari in any case are very
small, and it probably seemed that waiting for the inevitable Supreme Court ruling was
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III. THE PANEL REPORT
The EU and the United States were unable to reach an
agreement during their consultations. Therefore, on June 30,
2000, the EU requested the establishment of a Panel under Arti-
cle 6 of the DSU and Article 64.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, alleg-
ing that Section 211 of the OAA was in violation of the TRIPS
Agreement.69 On November 26, 2000, DSB established a Panel
to adjudicate the dispute.
In its Complaint to the DSB, the EU alleged that:
1. Section 211 (a) (1) of the OAA is inconsistent with Article
2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement in conjunction with Article
6quinquies A(1) of the Paris Convention (1967) and Arti-
cle 15.1 of the TRIPS Agreement;
2. Section 21(a) (2) of the OAA is inconsistent with Article
2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement in conjunction with Articles
2(1), 6bis (1) and 8 of the Paris Convention (1967), and
Articles 3.1, 4, 16.1, and 42 of the TRIPS Agreement; and
3. Section 211(b) of the OAA is inconsistent with Article 2.1
of the TRIPS Agreement, in conjunction with Articles
2(1), 6bis (1) and 8 of the Paris Convention (1967), and
Articles 3.1, 4, 16.1, and 42 of the TRIPS Agreement.
70
The EU said that these measures nullified and impaired its
rights and requested that the Panel find that the United States
was in violation of its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement,
and recommend that the United States bring its domestic legisla-
tion into conformity with its obligations under the TRIPS Agree-
ment.
In its response, the United States argued that Section 211 of
the OAA was not inconsistent with its obligations under the
TRIPS Agreement and requested that the Panel reject the claims
of the EU in their entirety.71
an unnecessary delay. This reasoning would prove correct; the Supreme Court denied
certiorari on October 2, 2000. See Havana Club Holding S.A. v. Bacardi and Co. Ltd., 531
U.S. 918 (2000).
69. See DSU, art. 6. See also TRIPS, art. 64.1.
70. European Communities v. United States, supra n.67, at para. 3.1. See infra Parts
III.A-G (discussing nature and substance of each of these TRIPS Sections and, by refer-
ence, Paris Convention provisions and analysis).
71. See European Communities v. United States, supra n.67, para. 3.4.
352 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:337
A. Scope of the TRIPS Agreement - Trade Names
First, the Panel turned to the question of whether trade
names, as opposed to trademarks, were covered by the TRIPS
Agreement. Section 211 refers to "mark, trade name, or com-
mercial name. ' 72 Trade name is defined under the Lanham Act
as "any name used by a person to identify his or her business or
vocation. ' 73 The Panel noted that the United States, in its sub-
missions, stated that under the Lanham Act trade name and
commercial name are synonymous. The Panel adopted this rep-
resentation, and used the term "trade name" in its ruling for
both. 4
Section 2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement incorporates by refer-
ence the Paris Convention. The EU alleged that Sections
211 (a) (2) and (b) were inconsistent with Article 8 of the Paris
Convention. Article 8 provides that trade names are to be pro-
tected by signatories of the Convention. 75 Therefore, the Panel
first determined whether trade names were covered by the
TRIPS Agreement.
The term "intellectual property" is defined in Article 1.2 of
the TRIPS Agreement as follows: "For the purposes of this
Agreement, the term intellectual property refers to all categories
of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1 through
7 of Part II [of the TRIPS Agreement]."76 Sections 1 through 7
of Part II list the following categories of intellectual property:
copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial de-
signs, patents, layout designs, integrated circuits, and protection
of undisclosed information.77 The term "trade name" does not
appear on this list. The Panel found that the list in Sections 1
through 7 of Part II was all-inclusive. It based this decision on
the language in Article 1.2 - "all categories." The Panel con-
cluded that trade names and commercial names were not cov-
ered by the TRIPS Agreement because they were not one of the
categories listed. Therefore, Sections 211(a) (2) and (b) were
not inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement in con-
72. OAA, Sec. 211.
73. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1126.
74. See European Communities v. United States, supra n.67, para. 8.21.
75. See Paris Convention, art. 8.
76. TRIPS, art. 1.2.
77. TRIPS, Part II.
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junction with Article 8 of the Paris Convention.78
B. Article 15.1 of the TRIPS Agreement and Article 6quinquies A(1)
of the Paris Convention - Protectable Subject Matter
Turning to trademarks, the Panel first analyzed whether
Section 211(a)(1) violated Section 15.1 of the TRIPS Agree-
ment.79 Section 211 (a) (1) provides that no transaction or pay-
ment shall be authorized or approved pursuant to 31 C.F.R. Sec-
tion 515.527 with respect to a mark that was used in connection
with the business or assets that were confiscated, unless the origi-
nal owner of the mark or the bona fide successor-in-interest has
expressly consented. Section 515.527 is the portion of the OFAC
Regulations, which provides for a general license for transac-
tions related to the registration and renewal of trademarks in the
PTO. This general license allows for the payment of the neces-
sary statutory fees for these registrations. Section 211 (a) (1) pro-
hibits this general license from applying to transactions or pay-
ments for marks, which had been confiscated by the Govern-
ment of Cuba, unless the original owner or its successor-in-
interest has consented.8 °
If OFAC did not issue a specific license to allow the payment
related to the registration or renewal of the trademark, this, in
conjunction with Section 211(a) (1), would prevent registration
or renewal of a mark because the statutory fees could not be
paid. The EU argued that such a situation had the effect of
preventing Cuban nationals from registering marks in the
United States as required by Article 15.1 of the TRIPS Agree-
ment.
The Panel noted, however, that Section 211 (a) (1) does not
deny trademark registrations as such. It denies trademark regis-
trations to those who are not deemed to be proper owners under
78. See European Communities v. United States, supra n.67, paras 8.23-8.27.
79. TRIPS Article 15.1 reads:
Any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or
services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings, shall be capable
of constituting a trademark. Such signs, in particular words including per-
sonal names, letters, numerals, figurative elements and combinations of
colours as well as any combination of such signs, shall be eligible for registra-
tion as trademarks.
Id.
80. See OAA, Sec. 211 (a) (1), supra n.25. See also European Communities v. United
States, supra n.67, paras. 8.59-8.60.
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U.S. law. Section 211 (a) (1) would not bar the original owner,
the successor-in-interest, or an individual who has the consent of
either party to register the trademarks that are used in connec-
tion with confiscated assets. Those individuals would be consid-
ered proper owners under Section 211 (a) (1).8 1 The Panel con-
cluded by stating that it found that Section 211 (a) (1)
[i]s not inconsistent with Article 15.1 of the TRIPS Agree-
ment because the term "other grounds," as used in Article
15.2 of the TRIPS Agreement,82 may include a measure that
denies trademark registration on the basis that the applicant
is not the owner under national law[,] and Section 211 (a)(1)
is a measure that deals with the ownership of the trademarks
used in connection with confiscated assets. 83
Article 6quinquies (a) (1) of the Paris Convention provides
that "[e]very trademark duly registered in the country of origin
shall be accepted for filing and protected as is in other countries
of the Union [ ... ]."" The Panel rejected the EU's contention
that Section 211 (a) (1) violated this Article for the same reason it
rejected the EU's claim that the Section violated Article 15.1.
The Panel found that Section 211 (a) (1) was a measure that reg-
ulated ownership rather than the form of a trademark or its re-
gistration .85
C. Articles 42 and 16.1 of the TRIPS Agreement -
Access to U.S. Courts
Next, the EU argued that by expressly denying the availabil-
ity of U.S. courts to-enforce the rights of registered U.S. trade-
mark holders, Section 211(a) (2) violated the U.S. obligations
under Article 42 of the TRIPS Agreement by denying trademark
holders fair and equitable procedures to enforce their marks.86
Article 42 provides that "[M]embers should make available to
the right holders civil judicial procedures concerning the en-
81. See European Communities v. United States, supra n.67, para. 8.65.
82. TRIPS Article 15.2 reads:
Paragraph I shall not be understood to prevent a Member from denying regis-
tration of a trademark on other grounds, provided that they do not derogate
from the provisions of the Paris Convention (1967).
Id. (emphasis added).
83. European Communities v. United States, supra n.67, para. 8.70.
84. Paris Convention, art. 6quinquies A (1).
85. See European Communities v. United States, supra n.67, para. 8.89.
86. See id. para. 8.90.
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forcement of any intellectual property right covered by this Agree-
ment."8 7
The EU contended that denying trademark owners the
right to have their marks enforced by a U.S. court was tanta-
mount to depriving them of their rights altogether because, as in
the case of most WTO Members, trademarks were primarily en-
forced in the United States in the civil judicial system."8 The
United States retorted that if the purported intellectual property
right is not "covered by this Agreement," i.e., one is not the
owner, Members are under no obligation to enforce that right
through their judicial systems."
The Panel disagreed with the United States. It found that
under the U.S. law, the registration of a trademark confers a
prima facie presumption of the registrant's ownership of the reg-
istered trademark. The person who enjoys the presumption of
being the owner of a trademark must be entitled to some level of
protection of its rights."0 The language of Section 211(a) (2)-
"[N]o U.S. court shall recognize, enforce or otherwise validate
any assertion of rights" -- had the effect of preventing the trade-
mark owner from substantiating its rights and, therefore, vio-
lated Article 42."
The EU also argued that the denial of access to U.S. courts
also violated Article 16.1, which states: "[t]he owner of a regis-
tered trademark shall have the exclusive right to prevent all
third parties not having the owner's consent from using in the
course of trade identical or similar signs for goods or services [
.. ].92 The EU argued that because the enforcement scheme
in the United States was through the civil courts, to be denied
access to those courts was to be denied the right to enforce one's
marks against unauthorized third-party use. Thus, Section
211 (a) (2) violated Article 16.1 as well as Article 42."
In contrast to its ruling on Article 42, the Panel found that
Section 211(a) (2) did not violate Article 16.1. The Panel con-
cluded that if owners could prove that they were the rightful
87. TRIPS, art. 42 (emphasis added).
88. See European Communities v. United States, supra n.67, para. 8.90.
89. Id. para. 8.93.
90. See id. para. 8.99.
91. See id. para. 8.100.
92. See id. paras. 8.103, 8.106. See also TRIPS, art. 16.1.
93. See id. para. 8.103.
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owners of the trademark, then there was nothing in Section
211(a)(2) which would bar them access to the courts. 4 The
Panel pointed out that nothing in Section 211 (a) (2) precluded a
U.S. court from making a determination of whether one was the
rightful owner. Because the rightful owner would have access to
the U.S. courts to enforce its marks, Section 211(a)(2) did not
violate Article 16.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 5
D. Article 6bis(1) of the Paris Convention
The next issue addressed was whether Section 211 (a) (2) vi-
olated Article 2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement in conjunction with
Article 6bis(1) of the Paris Convention. Article 6bis(1) of the
Paris Convention provides that a Member of the Union can re-
fuse or cancel the registration, and prohibit the use, of a trade-
mark, which is liable to create confusion with a mark "consid-
ered by the competent authority of the country of registration or
use to be well known in that country as being already the mark
of a person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used
for identical or similar goods."9 The Panel found that there was
nothing in Section 211(a) (2) that dealt with the refusal or can-
cellation of registrations and that the EU did not adequately ex-
plain or present evidence that was sufficient to demonstrate how
Section 211(a) (2) was inconsistent with the U.S. obligations
under Article 6bis. The Panel summarily denied this portion of
the EU Complaint.:
E. Article 3.1 of the TRIPS Agreement and Article 2(1) of the Paris
Convention - National Treatment
The Panel addressed the EU's argument that Section
211(a) (2) was inconsistent with the national treatment provi-
sions of Article 3.1 of the TRIPS Agreement and Article(2) (1) of
the Paris Convention.98 National treatment is the principle that
one must treat the nationals of other signatories no less favora-
bly than one treats its own nationals.99 The EU argued that Sec-
tion 211 (a) (2) applies to "designated nationals," which are basi-
94. See id. para. 8.111.
95. See id. para. 8.112.
96. Id. para. 8.115.
97. See id. para. 8.116.
98. See id. para. 8.124-8.140.
99. See d. para. 8.125.
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cally Cuba and Cuban nationals. The EU further argued that
the language in Section 211 referring to successors-in-interest,
referred only to nationals of a foreign country and not to U.S.
nationals. 00
Therefore, the EU contended that the statute treated "des-
ignated nationals" and nationals of foreign countries less favora-
bly than U.S. nationals. The United States admitted in its sub-
missions that Section 211 (a) (2) prohibited U.S. courts from rec-
ognizing or enforcing any right in a confiscated trademark by a
designated national (Cubat or Cuban national) or a national of a
foreign country, who is the successor-in-interest to the desig-
nated national. The United States stated, however, that the stat-
utory language did not include U.S. nationals when describing
successors-in-interest because a U.S. national can not become a
successor-in-interest to a "designated national" without first ob-
taining a specific license from OFAC.'' OFAC has never issued
such a license. The law also prohibited any transaction by which
a U.S. national might become a successor-in-interest through a
Cuban confiscating entity.10 2
The Panel began its discussion by noting that national treat-
ment is one of the most important principles in international
agreements on intellectual property rights.'1 3 The principle of
national treatment has been a requirement since the inception
of the Paris Convention in the late 19th Century. 104 Section
211 (a) (2) would seem to clearly violate this most basic principle
of intellectual property agreements because, on its face, it only
refers to foreign nationals and does not refer to U.S. nationals.
However, the Panel took into consideration that a U.S. national,
under law, could never be a successor-in-interest without a spe-
cific license from OFAC, and OFAC had never issued such a li-
cense.'0 5 Therefore, the effect on U.S. citizens and foreign na-
tionals of Section 211(a) (2) was the same, i.e., neither could
have their rights enforced by a U.S. court for the confiscated
trademarks.10 6 Thus, the Panel found that there was no less
100. See id. para. 8.123-8.124.
101. See id. para. 8. 124.
102. See id. See also 31 C.F.R. Sec. 515.201.
103. See id. para. 8.125.
104. See id.
105. See id. paras. 8.124, 8.140.
106. See id. paras. 8.135, 8.140.
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favorable treatment of foreign nationals, and no violation of the
national treatment provisions of the TRIPS Agreement or the
Paris Convention.10 7
F. Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement - Most-Favorite-Nation
For the same reasons, the Panel concluded that there was
no violation of the MFN provisions of the TRIPS Agreement con-
tained in Article 4.1°8 MFN treatment requires that "with regard
to the protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favor,
privilege, or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of
any other country shall be accorded immediately and uncondi-
tionally to the nationals of all other Members." 09
G. Consistency of Section 211(b) with the TRIPS Agreement
Section 211(b) basically parallels the access to U.S. courts
provision of Section 211(a) (2), except that it applies to trea-
ties.110 The purpose of Section 211(b) is that a confiscating en-
tity or its successor-in-interest cannot claim ownership rights to a
trademark in the United States by virtue of its foreign registra-
tion." 1 Congress specifically had the IAC in mind when it
passed Section 211(b). This was the treaty right invoked by
HCH and HCI in their complaint before the Southern District.
The United States argued that for the reasons Section 211 (a) (2)
was not inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement, so, too, was Sec-
tion 211 (b) not inconsistent.1 12
The EU claimed that Section 211(b) was inconsistent with
Article 16.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, for the same reasons it
claimed Section 211(a) (2) violated it. 1" The Panel found that
the EU's assertions concerning 211(b) were vague and that the
EU did not meet its burden of proving that Section 211(b) vio-
lated Article 16.1 of the TRIPS Agreement." 4 For the same rea-
son, i.e., that the EU did not meet its burden of proof, the Panel
found that Section 211 (b) did not violate Article 42 of the TRIPS
107. See id. para. 8.140.
108. See id. para. 8.148.
109. See id. para. 8.144. See also TRIPS, art. 4.
110. See id. para. 8.149.
111. See id. para. 8.150.
112. See id.
113. See id. para. 8.159.
114. See id. para. 8.153.
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Agreement; Article 2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement in conjunction
with Article 8 of the Paris Convention; or Article 6bis(1) of the
Paris Convention. 115 The Panel made the same rulings regard-
ing Article 3.1 of the TRIPS Agreement and Article 4 of the
TRIPS Agreement.'16 Taken together, the Panel found no viola-
tion by Section 211(b) of the TRIPS Agreement.
H. Conclusions and Appeal
Thus, the Panel found only one violation of the TRIPS
Agreement by the United States, the violation of Article 42. The
EU lost eleven out of twelve arguments.
Among the Panel's significant rulings was the assertion that
a country has the right to deny trademark registration and en-
forcement to marks, which are confiscated. This represented a
significant victory for the United States. It not only upheld the
U.S. basic position that 'it had the right to deny trademark en-
forcement to confiscated marks, but it also affirmed that the
U.S.-Cuban embargo, as further enforced by Section 211, was
not in violation of the WTO Agreements, including the TRIPS
Agreement. A potential foreign policy battle between the
United States on the one hand, and the EU and the WTO on the
other, was averted. There would have been a major political cri-
sis had the WTO struck down a portion of the U.S.-Cuban em-
bargo. A contrary ruling could possibly have sparked a trade war
between the United States and the EU, and may even have
threatened United States participation in the WTO.
The Dispute Panel, however, did rule that Section 211 vio-
lated the TRIPS Agreement by not allowing access to U.S. courts
for trademark holders to settle trademark disputes. This meant
that the United States would have to change its law to allow
HCH and HCI the right to enforce their marks in the U.S.
courts, or pay compensation. The ruling, in effect, would repeal
Section 211 (a) (2), and have the de facto effect of nullifying the
Second Circuit's ruling.
The DSU allows the losing party to appeal the ruling of a
Panel to the Appellate Body." 7 The Appellate Body is a stand-
ing body of the DSB comprised of seven members. Appellate
115. See id. paras. 8.164, 8.173.
116. See id. paras. 8.173, 8.176.
117. See DSU, art. 8.
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Panels are usually comprised of three persons. The Appellate
Body has sixty days to rule after the Panel's ruling is made pub-
lic. Both the United States and the EU appealed the ruling of
the Panel.
IV. THE RULING OF THE APPELLATE BODY
On the cross-appeal of the EU and the United States, the
matter went to the Appellate Body of the DSU. After determin-
ing that it was appropriate to review the Panel's conclusions
about the meaning of the measure (Section 211) at issue, the
Appellate Body made a threshold ruling that Section 211, which
conditioned rights on obtaining the expressed consent of the
original owner, was a measure that. dealt with ownership."'
Therefore, the Appellate Body ruled that it would address each
of the legal issues raised in the appeal with the understanding
that the measure before it, Section 211, was one that relates to
the ownership of a defined category of trademarks and trade
names.119
A. Article 6quinquies of the Paris Convention
First, the Appellate Body addressed the issue of whether
Section 211(a)(1) violated Article 6quinquies of the Paris Con-
vention. Article 6quinquies requires that "[E]very trademark duly
registered in the country of origin shall be accepted for filing
and protected as is in other countries of the Union, subject to
the reservations indicated in this Article."' 20 The EU argued
that this Article prevented the United States from taking any
measure that did not allow the registration of the trademark
"Havana Club" because the mark was already registered in its
originating country.
After analyzing the phrase "as is," including going back to
the original French phrase "telle queUe," the Appellate Body con-
cluded that Article 6quinquies, particularly when interpreted in
light of Article 6(1) of the Paris Convention, 21 clearly reserves
118. See World Trade Organization, United States - Section 211 Omnibus Appropria-
tions Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R, Doc. No. 02-001 (]an. 2, 2002), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/tatop-e/dispu e/dispu-status-e.htn [hereinafter European
Conrnmunities v. United States (Appeal)].
119. See id. para. 113.
120. Paris Convention, art. 6quinquies.
121. Paris Convention, art. 6(1) provides: "The conditions for filing and registra-
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to the countries of the Convention the right to determine the
conditions for filing and registration of trademarks by their do-
mestic legislation. Article 6quinquies does not prevent the
United States from having conditions of ownership, which could
prevent the registration of the marks.' Section 211 is a mea-
sure dealing with the ownership of a defined category of trade-
marks. Section 211 (a) (1) does not violate Article 6quinquies be-
cause the obligation of countries of the Paris Union to accept for
filing the protected trademark duly registered in the country of
origin "as is" does not encompass matters related to owner-
ship. 1 23 Therefore, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's rul-
ing that Section 211 (a)(1) was not inconsistent with Article 2.1
of the TRIPS Agreement in conjunction with Article 6quinquies
of the Paris Convention. 24
B. Article 15.1 of the TRIPS Agreement
For essentially the same reason, the Appellate Body upheld
the Panel in its ruling that Section 211 (a) (1) was not inconsis-
tent with Article 15.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 15.1 de-
fines protectable subject matter eligible for registration as a
trademark. Before the Panel, the EU claimed that Section
211(a) (1) was inconsistent with Article 15.1 because it prohib-
ited registration of trademarks that were protectable. The U.S.
position was that Section 211 (a) (1) did not concern or even ad-
dress "protectable subject matter," but rather concerned owner-
ship and thus, was not in violation of Article 15.1.125 In the alter-
native, the United States argued that even if Section 211 (a) (1)
did concern protectable subject matter, there was no violation of
Article 15.1 because Section 211(a) (1) fell within the exception
in Article 15.2, which permitted denial of registration on "other
grounds."
' 2 6
tion of trademarks shall be determined in each country of the Union by the domestic
legislation." Id.
122. See European Communities v. United States (Appeal), supra n.118, paras. 137,
139 (noting that art. 6(1) of the Paris Convention reserves to countries of Paris Union
right to determine conditions for filing and registration of trademarks by their domes-
tic legislation).
123. See id. para. 147.
124. See id.
125. See supra n.79 for text of TRIPS art. 15.1.
126. See European Communities v. United States (Appeal), supra n.118, para. 149.
See supra n.82 for text of TRIPS art. 15.2.
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The Panel found that the term "other grounds" used in Arti-
cle 15.2 could include a measure that denied trademark registra-
tion on the basis that the applicant was not the owner under the
law of the country involved, in this case, U.S. law. The Panel
concluded that Section 211 (a) (1) was a measure that dealt with
the ownership of trademarks used in connection with confis-
cated assets and, therefore, it was not inconsistent with Article
15.1.127
Again, as was the case in its ruling on Article 6quinquies, the
Appellate Body turned to Article 6(1) of the Paris Convention in
making its determination. The Appellate Body found that if Ar-
ticle 15.1 were interpreted to mean that a country was required
to register any mark that met the distinctiveness criteria speci-
fied in that Article, then WTO Members would be deprived of
the legislative discretion they enjoyed under Article 6(1). The
Appellate Body concluded, therefore, that Article 15.1 only lim-
ited the rights of countries to determine the conditions for filing
and registration of trademarks under their national laws, as they
related to the distinctiveness requirement set forth in Article
15.1. 128
Section 211 (a) (1) relates to ownership under U.S. law. The
Appellate Body found the Section did not concern the inherent
distinctiveness of marks as addressed by Article 15.1. Section
211 (a) (1) did not prevent someone from registering a mark that
was inherently distinctive, so long as that person met the owner-
ship requirements set forth in Section 211.129 Therefore, the
Appellate Body concluded that Section 211 (a) (1) was not incon-
sistent with Article 15.1 of the TRIPS Agreement and upheld the
Panel's ruling in that regard.13
C. Article 16.1 of the TRJPS Agreement
Article 16.1 states:
The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive
right to prevent all third parties not having the owner's con-
sent from using in the course of trade identical or similar
signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to
127. See European Communities v. United States (Appeal), supra n.118, para. 150.
128. See id. paras. 166-67, 178.
129. See id. paras. 155-56.
130. See id.
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those in respect of which the trademark is registered where
such use would result in the likelihood of confusion. 31
Article 16 has generally been construed to require an interna-
tionally agreed upon minimum level of exclusive rights that the
owner of a registered trademark enjoys and which all the WTO
Members must guarantee in their domestic legislation. 3 2
The EU argued before the Panel that Sections 211(a)(2)
and (b) deprived trademark owners of the exclusive rights con-
ferred on them by Article 16.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, because
they were denied access to the U.S. courts if they were a certain
class of trademark owners, i.e., those who owned trademarks
which had been confiscated without the permission of the
owner. 1" The Panel concluded that the EU had not provided
any evidence for concluding that Section 211(a)(2) would de-
prive a person who was deemed to be an owner of a registered
trademark by a U.S. court of that person's exclusive rights.
Therefore, the Panel ruled that there was no evidence that Sec-
tions 211(a) (2) or (b) was inconsistent with Article 16.1.134
In upholding the Panel's ruling, the Appellate Body went
further to affirmatively determine that neither Section 211 (a) (2)
nor (b) was inconsistent with Article 16.1. The Appellate Body
said that Article 16.1 gives exclusive rights to the owner of a
trademark but does not tell us who the owner is. The question
of who is the owner is to be determined by national law. Under
U.S. law, a person who has a trademark, which has been confis-
cated without the permission of the original owner, is not the
owner. If you are not the owner, you have no rights to the trade-
mark. Article 16.1, by its clear language only gives rights to own-
ers. Therefore, the Appellate Body concluded Sections
211 (a) (2) and (b) were not inconsistent with Article 16.1.'35
D. Article 42 of the TRIPS Agreement
Both the United States and EU appealed the Panel's deci-
sion on Article 42. The United States appealed the ruling that
Section 211(a) (2) violated Article 42 by denying access to judi-
131. TRIPS, art. 16.1.
132. See European Communities v. United States (Appeal), supra n.118, para. 186.
133. See id. para. 179.
134. See id. paras. 198-202.
135. See id.
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cial procedures to trademark owners. The EU appealed the
Panel's finding that it had not presented adequate evidence to
show that Section 211(b) violated Article 42.136
The Panel's findings on their face seemed somewhat incon-
sistent, as Section 211(a)(2) and Section 211(b) are mirror
images of each other. Both deny access to trademark holders to
U.S. courts. It would appear that if one were a violation of Arti-
cle 42, so would the other, and vice versa. The Appellate Body
agreed. It found, however, that both Sections 211(a) (2) and (b)
were not violations of Article 42,' overturning the Panel's ruling
that Section 211 (a) (2) was inconsistent with Article 42. This had
been the only point that the EU had won before the Panel be-
low.
The Appellate Body found that the due process rights set
out in Article 42 were clearly met through a judicial proceeding
conducted under the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Appellate Body continued that if
a court finds that one is not the owner of a trademark after a due
process hearing because the mark was confiscated without the
original permission of the owner, Article 42 does not require a
court to go any further.13 8
The Appellate Body stated: "[S] ection 211 (a) (2) does not
prohibit courts from giving right holders access to fair and equi-
table civil judicial procedures and the opportunity to substanti-
ate their claims and to present all relevant evidence."'1 Rather,
the Appellate Body concluded that Section 211 (a) (2) only re-
quires a court not to recognize trademark rights by persons who
136. See id. para. 203.
137. TRIPS Article 42 (Fair and Equitable Procedures) provides:
Members shall make available to the right holders civil judicial procedures
concerning the enforcement of any intellectual property right covered by this
Agreement. Defendants shall have the right to written notice, which is timely
and contains sufficient detail, including the basis of the claims. Parties shall
be allowed to be represented by independent legal counsel, and procedures
shall not impose overly burdensome requirements concerning mandatory per-
sonal appearances. All parties to such procedures shall be duly entitled to
substantiate their claims and to present all relevant evidence. The procedure
shall provide a means to identify and protect confidential information, unless
this would be contrary to existing constitutional requirements.
Id.
138. See European Communities v. United States (Appeal), supra n.118, paras. 222-
27.
139. Id. para. 227.
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have been determined not to own the trademark in question. 4 '
Applying the same logic, the Appellate Body made an identical
finding as concerns Section 211(b).41
This portion of the Appellate Body's decision represented a
major victory for the United States. Its scheme of preventing the
courts from recognizing and enforcing trademark rights as con-
cerns confiscated marks from Cuba had been upheld as legal
under the WTO Agreements. The United States, thus, had won
on the only issue on which the EU had prevailed before the
Panel below. Yet, it faced another reversal.
E. Article 2.1 of the Paris Convention and Article 3.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement - National Treatment
The Appellate Body then turned to the, issue of national
treatment, which is covered in Article 2(1) of the Paris Conven-
tion and Article 3.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. The Appellate
Body began its discussion of national treatment by pointing out
that it is one of the basic components of international intellec-
tual property agreements. National treatment had been a provi-
sion in the original Paris Convention of 1883. Most of the Mem-
bers of the EU were original or early Members of the Paris Con-
vention, with the last Memberjoining seventy-five years ago. The
United States has been a member of the Paris Convention since
1887 - 115 years ago. Therefore, the Appellate Body stated
that all parties to this controversy were extremely aware of their
obligations of national treatment and that they had provided
these rights to the nationals of other signatories for over one
hundred years.
What was new was that the Paris Convention had been in-
corporated by reference into the TRIPS Agreement. Therefore,
its obligations were now the obligations of all the Members of
the WTO. Also, enforcement of its provisions, including na-
tional treatment, was now under the DSU with its strong dispute
settlement procedures.' 42 The Appellate Body also noted that
the TRIPS Agreement had its own national treatment provision,
140. See id.
141. See id. paras. 229-31.
142. Previously, the provisions of the Paris Convention could only be enforced by
bringing a case before the International Court ofJustice ("ICJ"), which does not have
the automatic enforcement powers of the DSU. See Paris Convention, art. 28.
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thus, further emphasizing the basic significance of the obligation
of national treatment for the enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights. 4 3
The EU argued that Sections 211 (a) (2) and (b) violated the
national treatment obligation by treating non-U.S. nationals less
favorably than U.S. nationals both, where the law applied to suc-
cessors-in-interest and to original owners.144
Section 211 (a) (2) provides that U.S. courts are not to recog-
nize rights by a "designated national." '145 The term "designated
national" is defined in Section 211(d) (1) to include 1) Cuba; 2)
any Cuban national; 3) a "specially designated national"; or 4) "a
national of any foreign country who is a successor-in-interest to a
designated national."'146 The Panel below recognized that on the
face of it, Sections 211(a) (2) and (b) would appear to give less
favorable treatment to foreign nationals than to U.S. nationals as
concerns successors-in-interest.' 47 Sections 211(a)(2) and (b)
clearly provide that a foreign national, who is a successor-in-in-
terest to a designated national, may not have its rights to a mark
recognized or enforced by a U.S. court, while a U.S. national,
who is a successor-in-interest to a designated national, can have
its rights enforced if it has received a specific license from
OFAC. The Panel, however, accepted the U.S. argument that, as
a practical matter, OFAC, pursuant to Section 515.201 of 31
C.F.R., had never issued a specific license to a U.S. national to be
a successor-in-interest to an expropriated Cuban trademark.
Therefore, in practicality, there was no less favorable treat-
143. See European Communities v. United States (Appeal), supra n.118, paras. 233-
43.
144. See id. para. 244.
145. See supra n.26 for full text of sec. 211 (a) (2).
146. OAA Sec. 211 (d)(1) reads:
In this Section:
(1) The term "designated national" has the meaning given such term in Sec-
tion 515.305 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on Septem-
ber 9, 1998, and includes a national of any foreign country who is a successor-
in-interest to a designated national.
(2) The term "confiscated" has the meaning given such term in section
515.336 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on September 9,
1998.
Id.
147. See European Communities v. United States (Appeal), supra n.118, paras. 247-
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ment.148
The EU argued, however, that despite the United States' as-
sertion that no specific license had ever been granted to a U.S.
national, a non-U.S. national still faced an "extra hurdle." This
was because, assuming that one could get a specific license from
OFAC, a non-U.S. national would still have the additional hurdle
of a Section 211(a) (2) proceeding to enforce its mark while a
U.S. national would not.149
The Appellate Body ruled that while there was an extremely
small likelihood that a non-U.S. national would face the twin
hurdles of both Sections 515.201 and 211 (a) (2), it was still possi-
ble that a non-U.S. successor-in-interest could face two hurdles
while a U.S. successor-in-interest would not. This was inherently
less favorable treatment. Thus, the Appellate Body concluded
that Section 211(a) (2) violated the principle of national treat-
ment as set forth in Article 2(1) of the Paris Convention and
Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement, and reversed the Panel's deci-
sion.1 50
The Appellate Body, however, came to the opposite conclu-
sion concerning Section 211(b). Citing the Panel's decision it
said:
Section 211(b) states that U.S. courts shall not recognize, en-
force or validate any assertion of treaty rights by a "designated
national or its successor-in-interest." The difference between
Section 211(a)(2) and Section 211(b) is that the latter
contains the additional term-"its successor-in-interests"-
whereas the former just refers to a "designated national." 15 1
The Appellate Body continued: "Section 211 (b) is not limited to
foreign nationals which means that it includes U.S. nationals.
This would mean that any transfer of trademarks used in con-
nection with confiscated assets to any national, including U.S.
nationals, would be subject to Section 211(b). ' 152 Therefore,
there is no less favorable treatment between foreign nationals
and U.S. nationals and no violation of national treatment.153
Having decided the successor-in-interest prong of Sections
148. See id. paras. 248-53.
149. See id. paras. 255-56.
150. See id. paras. 261-64, 269.
151. Id. para. 270.
152. Id.
153. See id. paras. 271-72.
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211(a) (2) and (b) on national treatment grounds, the Appellate
Body then went on to the owner prong of the statute. The had
argued that, with respect to original owners, Sections 211(a) (2)
and (b) did not accord national treatment to foreign owners, as
opposed to original owners who were U.S. nationals. The EU
argued that both Sections 211(a) (2) and (b) violated the na-
tional treatment obligation because they provided less favorable
treatment to Cuban nationals who were original owners than to
U.S. nationals who were original owners. 54
To support this argument, the EU put forth a specific hypo-
thetical. In this hypothetical, the EU asked the Appellate Body
to consider the following set of facts:
There are two separate trademark owners who acquired
rights in two separate United States trademarks, either at
common law or based on registration, before the Cuban con-
fiscation occurred. Each of these two United States trade-
marks is the same as the trademark registered in Cuba. That
same Cuban trademark was used in connection with a busi-
ness that was confiscated. Neither of the two original owners
of the two United States trademarks was the owner of the
mark registered in Cuba. Those two original owners seek to
assert rights in the United States in their two respective
United States trademarks. The situation is the same for these
two original owners for the two United States trademarks with
one exception. One original owner is a national of Cuba and
the other original owner is a national of the United States.' 55
The EU then argued that under Sections 211 (a) (2) and (b),
an original owner, who is a Cuban national, is subject to its provi-
sions while an original owner who is a U.S. national is not.
Therefore, the Cuban national is given treatment less favorable
than the U.S. national, and this is a violation of the national
treatment obligations of the United States under the TRIPS
Agreement.
The Appellate Panel noted that Sections 211 (a) (2) and (b)
applied to "designated nationals," who are defined as "Cuba and
any national thereof." Sections 211 (a) (2) and (b) apply to origi-
nal owners who are Cuban nationals, but do not apply to original
owners who are U.S. nationals, as they are not covered by the
154. See id. para. 275.
155. Id. para. 276.
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definition of "designated nationals." Thus, U.S. nationals are
not subject to the limitations of Sections 211(a) (2) and (b).156
Therefore, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel and ruled
that Sections 211(a)(2) and (b) were discriminatory on their
face and inconsistent with the national treatment obligations of
the United States under Article 2.1 of the Paris Convention and
Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement.'57
F. Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement - Most-Favorite-Nation
For essentially the same reasons, the Appellate Body found
that Sections 211(a) (1) and (b) violated the MFN treatment as
provided in Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement. 5 The Appellate
Body began by saying that MFN, like national treatment, was one
of the cornerstones of international trade treaties. For over half
a century, it had been an obligation of Members of the GATT to
afford MFN treatment to the other Members of the GATT. The
United States and most of the Members of the EU were original
Members of the GATT. The Appellate Body noted that the MFN
requirement contained in Article 1 of the GATT had been criti-
cal to the orderly international trade of goods in the post-war
era. The Appellate Body continued that unlike national treat-
ment, there was no MFN provision in the Paris Convention.
However, the framers of the TRIPS Agreement found it so im-
portant that they extended its protections to intellectual prop-
erty law. Therefore, the MFN obligation must be accorded the
same significance as concerns intellectual property as it has been
accorded by the GATT with respect to trade in goods. The Ap-
pellate Body concluded: "It is, in a word, fundamental."159
The Panel found that Sections 211(a) (2) and (b) did not
violate the MFN provision of the TRIPS Agreement. The Appel-
late Body, following the same hypothetical set forth by the EU in
its analysis of national treatment, ruled to the contrary and over-
turned the Panel's decision. The Appellate Body found that on
the face of the statute, an original owner who was a Cuban na-
tional was subject to Sections 211 (a) (2) and (b), while an origi-
156. See id. paras. 277-79.
157. See id. para. 296.
158. See TRIPS, art.4.
159. See European Communities v. United States (Appeal), supra n.118, para. 297.
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nal owner who was a non-Cuban foreign national, was not.""
The definition of "designated national" in Section 515.305
of 31 C.F.R. and Section 211 (d) (1) includes non-Cuban foreign
nationals only when they are successors-in-interest to Cuba or
Cuban nationals. Non-Cuban foreign nationals who are original
owners are not covered by the definition of "designated na-
tional" and are not subject to Sections 211(a)(2) and (b).
Therefore, Sections 211 (a) (2) and (b) are discriminatory as be-
tween a Cuban national and a non-Cuban foreign national, both
of whom were original owners of the U.S. trademarks composed
of the same mark used in connection with a business that was
confiscated by Cuba. 6 ' For this reason, Section 211 was in viola-
tion of the MFN provision of the TRIPS Agreement because a
privilege granted by a Member (the United States) to a national
of another country was not granted to nationals of all Members.
G. Trade Names
Finally, the Appellate Body turned its attention to the issue
of whether trade names were covered under the TRIPS Agree-
ment. The Panel below had found that they were not. Conse-
quently, the Panel had limited its findings on the inconsistencies
of Sections 211 (a) (2) and (b) to the issue of trademarks.' 62
The United States and the EU both urged the Appellate
Body to overturn the Panel's decision that trade names were not
covered by the TRIPS Agreement. The EU, however, argued
that Sections 211 (a) (2) and (b) were inconsistent with the U.S.
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement for trade names. Of
course, the United States disagreed.'63
The Appellate Body began its analysis by discussing the
Panel's reasoning in deciding that trade names were not covered
by the TRIPS Agreement. Article 1.2 of the TRIPS Agreement
provides: "[f] or the purposes of this Agreement, the term 'intel-
lectual property' refers to all categories of intellectual property
that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part II". ' These
Sections of the TRIPS Agreement list a number of intellectual
160. See id. paras. 306-09.
161. See id. paras. 307-10.
162. See id. para. 323.
163. See id. paras. 323-25.
164. TRIPS, Art. 1.2
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property categories that are covered: patents, trademarks, geo-
graphical indications and the like. These Sections do not list
trade names. Therefore, the Panel concluded that trade names
were not covered by the TRIPS Agreement under Article 1.2.165
Next, the Panel reviewed Section 2.1 of the TRIPS Agree-
ment, which incorporates by reference the Paris Convention
and which states: "[iln respect of Parts II, III, and IV of this
Agreement, Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12
and Article 19 of the Paris Convention (1967)." Article 8 of the
Paris Convention specifically covers trade names. The Panel,
however, concluded that the words "in respect of' in Article 2.1
were limiting as to the incorporation of the provisions of the
Paris Convention, including Article 8. That is, that the Members
of the TRIPS Agreement had to comply with Articles 1 through
12 and Article 19 of the Paris Convention "in respect of' what
was covered in Parts II, III, and IV of the TRIPS Agreement, i.e.,
the rights enumerated. Trade names were not enumerated and
therefore, were not covered.' 66
The Appellate Body disagreed with this analysis. It noted
that to adopt this line of reasoning would essentially have the
effect of writing Article 8 of the Paris Convention out of the
TRIPS Agreement. The Appellate Body stated that this could
not have been the intent of the framers as they specifically in-
cluded the incorporation of Article 8 into the TRIPS Agreement
through Article 2.1. Further, the Appellate Body concluded that
the list of types of intellectual property in the TRIPS Agreement
was by way of enumeration and not limitation. The Appellate
Body stated that the mistake the Panel made was that it inter-
preted the phrase "intellectual property" as referring to all cate-
gories of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1
through 7 of Part II as if that phrase read "intellectual property
means those categories of intellectual property appearing in the
titles of Section 1 through 7 of Part II.167
The Appellate Body felt that this interpretation ignored the
plain meaning of Article 1.2 by failing to take into account the
phrase "the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part II deals not
165. See European Communities v. United States (Appeal), supra n.118, paras. 326-
28.
166. See id. paras. 329-32.
167. Id. para. 335.
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only with the categories of intellectual property indicated in
each Section, but with other subjects as well. ' 168 Therefore, the
Appellate Body concluded that trade names were covered by the
TRIPS Agreement and overturned the Panel's decision in this
regard. 169
Next, the Appellate Body turned to the issue of whether
Section 211 violated the TRIPS Agreement as concerns trade
names as opposed to trademarks. After analyzing the relevant
portions of the Lanham Act, noting that trade names were given
the same protection under American law as common law trade-
marks, the Appellate Body concluded that for the same reasons
it ruled that Section 211 violated national treatment and MFN
for trademarks, so too did it violate these two basic principles for
trade names. 17
Consequently, the Appellate Body found, as concerns trade
names, that Section 211(a) (2) was in violation of national treat-
ment as concerns successors-in-interest while Section 211 (b) was
not; Sections 211 (a) (2) and (b) were in violation of national
treatment as concerns owners; and Sections 211(a) (2) and (b)
were in violation of MFN as concerns both owners and succes-
sors-in-interest.
H. The Appellate Body's Conclusion
In its concluding remarks, the Appellate Body emphasized
that its decision was not a ruling on confiscation or the appropri-
ateness of a WTO Member expropriating intellectual property
without compensation. The Appellate Body continued to state
that it was not expressing any opinion, nor should it do so con-
cerning whether a Member of the WTO should recognize in its
own territory trademarks or trade names which had been confis-
cated without compensation in another territory. However, the
Appellate Body concluded:
[W]here a WTO Member chooses not to recognize intellec-
tual property rights in its own territory relating to a confisca-
tion of rights in another territory, a measure resulting from
and implementing that choice must, if it affects other WTO
Members, comply with the TRIPS Agreement by which all
168. Id.
169. See id. paras. 337-41.
170. See id. paras. 342-59.
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WTO Members are voluntarily bound. In such a measure,
that WTO Member must accord "no less favorable treatment"
to the nationals of all other WTO Members than it accords to
its own nationals, and must give to the nationals of all WTO
Members "any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity"
granted to any other WTO Member.'
7 1
The Appellate Body in its decision found that the United




The United States announced in April 2002 that, pursuant
to discussions with the EU, it would comply with the DSB's rul-
ing and change Section 211 of the OAA to make it consistent
with the TRIPS Agreement. Article 21 of the DSU allows a Mem-
ber a "reasonable period" of time to implement the recommen-
dation of the DSB.'M This reasonable period should not exceed
fifteen months from the date of the adoption by the DSB of the
Appellate Body's report. The United States stated that it would
make the necessary legislative changes by December 31, 2002 or
when the current session of the U.S. Congress would adjourn,
but in no event later than January 3, 2003.17 ' As of the date that
this Article is being written, it does not appear that the U.S. Con-
gress will meet this deadline if for no other reason than because
of the general gridlock in the Congress.17
While it would be a relatively easy technical matter to
amend Section 211 to make it compatible with the TRIPS Agree-
ment, it is not entirely clear how this could be done in a manner
that would still give Bacardi rights to the mark and prevent
Pernod-Ricard from enforcing its marks in the United States
without adversely affecting other U.S. interests. The whole pur-
pose of Section 211 was to discriminate against Pernod-Ricard in
favor of Bacardi. To remove the discrimination against Pernod-
Ricard would mean that. marks are enforceable in the United
171. Id. para. 363.
172. See id. paras. 326-63.
173. See DSU, art. 21.
174. See Ravi Kanth, U.S. to Comply With Havana Club Ruling, Make Changes in Statute
by January 2003, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. no. 15, 663 (Apr. 11, 2002).
175. On January 7, 2003, the United States and the EU circulated a communica-
tion to WTO Members extending the deadline to June 30, 2003.
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States. To universalize the ban on enforcing trademarks confis-
cated by Cuba so that it applied equally to U.S. nationals as well
as non-U.S. nationals, would protect Bacardi's position but could
hurt other U.S. business interests, especially abroad.
Politics have again intervened. OFAC repealed the special
license to Pernod-Ricard and Congress passed Section 211 only
after heavy lobbying by Bacardi. The whole purpose of both ac-
tions was to prevent Pernod-Ricard, through HCH and HCI,
from enforcing its mark in federal court. Without these actions,
Pernod-Ricard would have won.
Documents recently released through a Freedom of Infor-
mation request showed the Florida Governor's office engaging
in an intensive lobbying campaign to influence the PTO on Ba-
cardi's behalf after the WTO ruled in January 2002. These ac-
tions allegedly included efforts to have political appointees over-
rule career employees in their decisions on the case as they tried
to implement the WTO decision, and caused the removal from
the case of a PTO lawyer who had made a preliminary ruling in
Pernod-Ricard's behalf. Bacardi has been a major contributor to
the Florida Republican party.176 These actions bring into ques-
tion if the United States is actually going to change the law to
bring it into compliance with the DSB's ruling, or change it in a
manner that would satisfy the EU. If the EU deems the U.S.
changes insufficient, it can bring the United States back before
the WTO for a summary enforcement proceeding. 177
If the United States does not change the law by the dead-
line, then it could be subject to sanctions by the WTO. The EU
could either demand compensation or seek retaliation. 178 If the
United States did have to pay compensation, this would create
an additional political issue. It would mean that other U.S. in-
dustries and U.S. exporters would suffer through imposition of
higher tariffs put on their goods by the EU. This cost and its
harm to the U.S. economy would essentially be a subsidy to the
private interests of Bacardi, a Bermuda-based corporation. 179
176. See Thomas B. Edsall, Gov. Bush Reveals Lobby Effort; Documents Show Interven-
tion in Trademark Case, Wash. Post, Oct. 18, 2002, at A12, col. 3.
177. See DSU, art. 22 in conjunction with arts. 21 and 23.
178. See id.
179. In reviewing this case, it is somewhat ironic to note that the United States
stated at the time of its joining the WTO that two of the major items which it had
achieved as concerns dispute settlement were: 1) automatic adoption of Appellate Body
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Regardless of how matters resolve themselves, what the case
does show is that the WTO has the power to make a country
change its laws, pay compensation, or suffer retaliation. This is
somewhat in contrast to what the United States represented
when it introduced the Uruguay Road Implementation Act in
1994. The SAA specifically stated that "it is important to note
that the new WTO dispute settlement system does not give
panels any power to order the United States or other countries
to change their laws."""° The SAA continued stating that
"[r]eports issued by panels or the Appellate Body under the
DSU have no binding effect under the law of the United States
and do not represent an expression of U.S. foreign or trade pol-
icy." '181 If a report recommends that the United States change
federal law to bring it into conformity with an Uruguay Round
Agreement, it is for the Congress to decide whether any such
change will be made." 2
While this is technically true, it may be politically or finan-
cially difficult, if not impossible, to pay the compensation or re-
taliation. Damages in this case have been estimated to be up to
U.S.$250 million.' Essentially, the choice one has if the WTO
finds a law in violation of one of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments, is to change the law according to the DSB's recommenda-
tions, or pay what amounts to a huge fine, a fine that continues
year after year until the law is changed. What this means in real-
ity is that WTO decisions under the DSU border on self-execut-
ing legal decisions. If the United States does change Section
211, the WTO's decision will have the practical effect of invali-
dating a law passed by the U.S. Congress and of overruling, de
facto, a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals.
As for the WTO, the case made clear that trade names, as
well as trademarks, are covered by the TRIPS Agreement. This
was important from a systemic point of view because it covered a
possible gap in the types of intellectual property protected by
reports and a request for retaliation; and 2) automatic authority for complaining par-
ties to retaliate, including in sectors outside the subject of the dispute on request if
Panel recommendations are not implemented and if there is no mutual satisfactory
solution (compensation) to the matter. See SAA, supra n.9, at 1008.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 1032.
183. See Pruzin, supra n.18,at 1471.
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the TRIPS Agreement. The Appellate Body's ruling also af-
firmed the basic right of a country to establish the terms of own-
ership of trademarks within that country, and, in particular, up-
held the right of a country to deny registration and enforcement
of marks, which have been confiscated. These two rulings are
significant in themselves and are important additions to WTO
jurisprudence in the protection of international intellectual
property rights.
Finally, the WTO firmly and emphatically reaffirmed the
principles of national treatment and MFN. It made clear that
discrimination between nationals and non-nationals, no matter
what the reason-even national security-would not be allowed
in the trade agreements administered by the WTO. This is per-
haps the most important result of the whole case.
